Russian Policy in the Caucasus, Russia in International Politics-2011

Davit Stepanyan, “Arminfo” news agency-www.arminfo.am (Armenia)

1. In its policy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan Russia is continuing to attempt at the development of good relations with both countries. How successful is Russia in its attempts? Are these attempts promising?

–It takes a lot of effort and is hard to succeed, but this is the only correct policy. Armenia is the strategic ally of Russia, but Azerbaijan is no enemy either. Moreover, only maintaining good relations with both countries we may achieve augmented influence in the negotiation process. But the situation in Nagorno Karabakh shows that the parties are so unprepared to agree on anything less than complete victory that even the opposite approaches will not yield any results. Look, Russia is trying to maintain good relations with both states: Turkey has collided with Armenia and has unequivocally taken Baku’s side. However, neither this nor that will yield any positive results.

2. Baku has many times announced of the inefficiency of the OSCE MG, blaming the co-chairing countries for not being constructive. Iran and Turkey have many times expressed a wish to participate in the regulation process. Do you expect any changes in the format of the negotiation process over the Nagorno Karabakh conflict in the near future?

–Theoretically it is possible. See a comment below.

3. Recently the government of Turkey has again sent the Armenian-Turkish protocols into the Parliament. Do you think Turkey can reanimate the process of the ratification of Zurich protocols without any progress in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement?

–I think that a possibility of such a development is excluded.

4. Any breach of the present status quo will lead to the renewal of large-scale hostilities, moreover, with the involvement of much more forces from either party. Besides, most analysts speak for the preservation of the status quo. How beneficial is this to Armenia and how beneficial it is to Russia, France and the USA, taking into consideration the fact that the Madrid principles are not one-hundred percent acceptable to either the Armenian or the Azerbaijani side. What is the relatively realistic scenario of the NK conflict resolution that is acceptable from the perspective of the national interests of Armenia?

-There will be no large-scale military actions, especially such that involve large forces from both parties. Azerbaijan has a chance for victory only if it undertakes a lightning offensive, but the latter is impossible. If the military actions last longer than 5 – 7 days, the “pipe” factor will increase for Baku – the countries who are sitting at the other end of the pipe and receive oil and gas will force Azerbaijan to terminate the war due to the fear of the threat this war may bring to them. There will be no large scale war. It is a different issue that for Yerevan it means that the procrastination of the status quo, and consequently, the blockade and so on will inevitably lead to a larger increase in the gap between the economic potentials of the two countries. It is impossible to exclude that in 10 – 15 years this gap will be so large that Baku will acquire a possibility for a lightning offensive. If it so happens, Azerbaijan will not hesitate for even a minute.

5. Can we say that losing the Syria of Bashar Asad Russia will abandon the Near and Middle East forever? Does Turkey play by itself in this game with Syria or is it still being directed by NATO?

-I will refrain from answering this question, for I do not think I am competent enough regarding issues of Russian and Syrian relations.

Tarana Kyazimova, “Turan” news agency-www.contact.az (Azerbaijan)

1. Can the policy led by Russia in South Caucasus be considered successful?

–Generally, it cannot. But here we should be looking at the state in which Russia started this “game,” what trump cards it had and what results it has achieved in every concrete case. This is as big question. I more or less answered that question in my article, titled Russia in South Caucasus. What is wrong? I would like to refer you to it.

2. Why does Russia negatively treat the Transcaspian pipeline? What can such attitude be accounted for?

–It is accounted for the unwillingness to see more competition and the loss of levers of influence.

3. So far Russia has enjoyed the trust of the parties as a mediator. But will it persist if the negotiation process comes to grief? Which country or organization will become a mediator for the conflicting parties?

–The question here is what will be IN THE STEAD OF the failed negotiations process. The natural wish of the party who considers that its interests have not been defended during the negotiations process is to draw in as many heavy-weight mediators standing around as possible. In this case it is not excluded that the team of negotiators will change. What it will look like and how things will develop is not possible to predict now.

Aydin Kerimov, “Novoye Vremya” newspaper-www.novoye-vremya.com (Azerbaijan)

1. Is the mediating activity of Russia for the resolution of frozen conflicts anticipated in South Caucasus?

–I think there will be a lowered activity in the issue of Karabakh, and the situation around Abkhazia and South Ossetia is not perceived as a conflict in Russia, but a “new reality,” and as it is known, no mediators are needed in such a case.

2. Is the restoration of relations of Russia with the incumbent President of Georgia possible?

–Certainly, but only in court. In all other senses, dear Aydin, this man has become impossible to shake hands with till the end of his days. This is still an extremely mild and humane position. Imagine what the US would do to a President who has ordered to eliminate a whole town with American citizens and to kill their peace-keepers. Last time it happened, a whole country – Afghanistan – had to pay off, even though on the whole it did not have anything to do with the implied happenings.

3. How important does Russia think the energy policy led in South Caucasus?

–Surely it is important. Over 50% of the GDP of Russia is yielded from the sales of energy carriers. The “tube” economy imposes its restrictions and dictates its interests. It is a different issue that this is always a multi-option policy, and if some clever heads in the neighboring countries who are in friendly relations with Russia think that if they put pressure on Russia manipulating the energy levers and determine the development of “say” Nabucco project based on the position Russia holds regarding Nagorno Karabakh, Russia will immediately give everyone up as empty jars because of the extreme importance of the energy issue. Russia does not believe so, and we can mention the failure of quite a number of similar projects, but many more of those have been emerging… There is always a line here, which we cannot cross. It is a shame that the creators of such projects do not realize this.

4. What do you think Russia’s attitude to the geopolitical interests of the USA and European Union countries in South Caucasus is?

–Russia has always been attentive and respectful, somehow cautious and not forgetful of the ongoing competition.

Natig Javadli, “Bizim Yol” newspaper-www.bizimyol.az (Azerbaijan)

1. The occupation in August 2008 coincided with Putin’s term as President of Russia. Won’t Putin’s return to office cause a renewal of the well-known events in South Caucasus?

–I refuse to speak using the term “occupation.” It is a matter of principle.

2. What would you like to see in the upcoming 5 (five) years in the relations of Russia with the republics in South Caucasus?

–Warm and friendly, even though I am afraid that this will not be possible with absolutely all countries.

3. Is the solution of the internal social, political and economic problems possible through the intervention of Russia into the problems between Armenia and Azerbaijan and among Georgia and Abkhazia and Ossetia? What are the possible factors that hinder this solution?

Answer-

Armen Minasyan, panorama.am (Armenia)

1. Hello. What do you think the further developments of the resolution process of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is and what Russia’s role should be in this process? Do you think there are any short-term chances for signing a framework agreement on the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict?

–I see four scenarios for the development: 1. The continuation of the current inefficient policy of useless negotiations and a higher probability of a short-term “accidental” conflict instigated by Baku, 2. Refusal to continue negotiations because of the unpreparedness of the parties and freezing the situation for 10 more years with provision of international guarantees for the non-renewal of hostilities. 3. The continuation of sluggish negotiations along with the active influence on the communities of Armenia and Azerbaijan, attempting to push them towards readiness for a compromise. 4. The creation of an international coalition to force Baku and Yerevan to compromise according to the resolution worked out by the international community.  Currently there are no chances for signing a framework agreement on Nagorno Karabakh.

2. The experience of conflict resolution testifies to the fact that the probable outcome must also have side effects. In particular, it is known that a factual resolution is possible only in the context of regional cooperation. Do you think that a quick resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is possible if the anti-Armenian propaganda and the enrooted feeling of hatred is augmenting in Azerbaijan among the general public which excludes the possibility of mutual trust and regional cooperation? 

–The main part of the answer see above. The only thing that I would like to add is that we should not blame only one side for everything. Anti-Azerbaijani propaganda has also been seen in Armenia, and if both parties took at least one step to meet each other halfway, this would seriously contribute to mutual trust. In mutual conflicts, as well as in a family, there are no angels and demons as a rule.

3. Do you think that an escalation of conflicts in South Caucasus is possible in the near future? Do you think there are any instruments that will prevent the escalation of conflicts in South Caucasus, and if so, who holds them?   

–There is a potential for the escalation of conflicts in South Caucasus. This relates at least to the possibility of the short-term spontaneous conflict in Nagorno Karabakh and the possibility of provoking and unleashing a short-term conflict provocation in Abkhazia by Georgia, right on the eve of the Olympiad.  It is difficult to name a concrete state, holding the keys to the prevention of conflicts in its hands. These are always several pairs of hands which by the way are often not very friendly to each other. It is very difficult to answer this question in this Q&A format; this is rather a dissertation topic.

4. How would you comment on the attempts of the official Ankara to interfere with the process of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict resolution?

–I am sorry, but we do not have enough time for me to answer that question.

5. Do you think the spread of the “Arab syndrome” into the countries of South Caucasus and in particular into Georgia and Azerbaijan possible?

–Theoretically, yes, it is quite possible.

6. How would you comment on the announcement made by the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergei Lavrov at the UN Assembly General that Russia definitely intends to undertake every necessary measure in order not to allow the scenario with the use of arms and escalation of violence in the Caucasus? Is Russia ready to undertake all the necessary steps to secure peace in the region, especially if there is an unlawful use of force by any of the parties? Who do you think this statement is addressed to in the context of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict?

–I think that this is a diplomatic form. Russia is not going to interfere in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict militarily.

7. How would you comment on the statements made by the second secretary of the Security Agency of the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Azerbaijan Elchin Huseynli, who declared that the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs create an opportunity for the artificial procrastination of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict?

–I do not agree to this. If Mr. Huseynli thinks that the only solution is the solution in line with Baku’s scenario, and all the rest is mere procrastination, he should be reminded of other perspectives; hence, the answers to the questions should incorporate those perspectives, too.

8. Please also comment on another statement made by Elchin Huseynli that the relations between Russia and Armenia “cause instability in the region.”

–Cause instability for whom? Perhaps Armenia thinks that these relations, on the contrary, bring stability. Yes, the Russian and Armenian relations somehow stop Azerbaijan from resolving the Karabakh issue in a military or any other way that would be tougher than what we have today. But if we stand firmly on such positions, we could say that it is the Azerbaijani and Turkish relations that bring instability to the region. Some people in Yerevan will think that this statement is true, but either statement would be extremely arbitrary and will not contribute to the resolution of the situation.  I would like to say it once again that I personally hold deep convictions that peace and calm in this region are achievable only on the basis of a profound compromise by both parties, and unfortunately, both parties have not yet matured to realize this.

9. In your article entitled Russia in Trancaucasus: What Is Wrong? dated August 3^rd, you in essence support the perspective that Russia is losing the Caucasus, constantly making political mistakes in this region. Two months have passed after the publication of your article. Do you think Russia has corrected its mistakes?

–I did not say that Russia has constantly and exclusively made mistakes. Moreover, I said that the same actions Moscow undertakes are perceived differently, at least, in Baku and Yerevan. Whatever Armenia may consider right, Azerbaijan may qualify as a mistake. But certainly there are mistakes, too. Currently I can see neither desire, nor attempts to solve them. But let’s hope that two months is not a long term and things will settle all right.

Anna Bartkulashvili, freelance journalist (Azerbaijan)

1.Good afternoon, Mr. Yepifatsev! Thank you for participating in our project. Do you agree to the point that Georgia is the only country in South Caucasus in forefront of democratic reforms? Answer [time:10/12/2011 2:47:05 AM(MSK)]

-Anna, I do not want to hurt you. Do you agree to this assertion yourself? Problems with democratic reforms are there in every country in the region, just as they are there in Russia, too. I am sorry but I think it would be ridiculous to rip Georgia out from among those countries and to make it the leader or the vanguard. You have formed a police state where in the modern times the power has not been granted by elections; your opposition is oppressed, and in the last 2 – 3 years oppositional parties have not received a tetri from domestic business – people are merely afraid. Your President was about to be overthrown a couple of times. And you call this vanguard?  And still once again I do not want to draw Georgia in dark colors. We very well recognize that both Azerbaijan and Armenia and Tskhinval and Sukhum also have a great number of problems in this regard. But I had better abstain from defining the concept of a vanguard. Sorry.

2. What changes do you personally forecast for the future in the situation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia?

–These are quite different cases. The countries will remain unrecognized by the wide circles of the international community and will be incredibly dependent on Russia. Russia itself will try not to make any abrupt changes in its policy in relation to Abkhazia and South Ossetia at least by the end of the Olympic Games. After this we cannot exclude tougher policy led in relation to Abkhazia, bringing the policy led by Sukhum in line with the interests of Moscow (now Sukhum’s policy often contradicts Moscow’s interests), and in the case with Tskhinval I do not exclude the possibility of some integration processes with North Ossetia and Russia, in a broader sense. This does not necessarily have to be an immediate accession of North Ossetia into South Ossetia or the Russian Federation, but a formula for ties closer than now will be found. And separately, it should be written that in the near future it is quite possible that with regard to South Ossetia attempts will be made to regulate the expenditure of federal money directed to the restoration of this republic after the war and decreasing existent corruption.  Let us survive the South Ossetian elections and then we’ll see who will come to lead the country. It is probable that this will answer some questions.  Russia will never “surrender” Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgia, this is excluded, and this is right.

3. Does the renewal of the military phase of the Armenian and Azerbaijani conflict carry any political and economic threats to the EU? Is it fraught with the loss of the influence of the EU on the situation in South Caucasus?

–Any hostilities in any region in South Caucasus will mean some loss of the influence of the EU on the region. On the other hand, we should still understand that this region is not a key one to the EU, it is not a region that holds the EU’s vital interests. In the light of disintegrating economic and political positions within the EU itself it is difficult to expect that its influence on South Caucasus will increase. In my opinion, this is impossible. On the other hand, we cannot exclude situations where the activities of the EU can even help it to increase its influence in the region. The renewal of full scale and long term military activities over Nagorno Karabakh is very unlikely.  In case of a local conflict, if the EU (just as in the situation with the resolution of the 08.08.08 issue) effectively fulfills a mediating function (and this is very likely), its influence may even increase. Everything will depend on the concrete situation.

Gohar Karapetyan, “Panarmenian” news agency-www.panarmenian.net (Armenia)

1. How realistic are the changes in the political course Russia will pursue in the Caucasus, after the return of Vladimir Putin? Will he continue active mediation in the process of the resolution of the Karabakh conflict Medvedev has undertaken?

2. What will the influence of the construction of NABUCCO be on Russian and Azerbaijani relations? How could the recent developments in the Turkish and Russian relations be assessed in connection with gas supply in this context?

3. How do you assess the strengthening of the ties between South Caucasian countries and the EU within the Eastern Partnership framework? How can the deepening of cooperation with the EU impact on the relations of these countries with Russia?

–I apologize, Gohar, but I will probably answer your questions some other time.

Artak Barsegyan, Public Radio of Armenia-www.armradio.am 

1. Will the policy led by Moscow in South Caucasus be reviewed with Putin’s return to the Kremlin? In particular, with regard to Medvedev’s mediation mission over the resolution of the Karabakh conflict?

–This is not an easy question. It is more likely that after some failing negotiations that we have had by the personal initiative and under the patronage of Medvedev, the activity of Moscow in the negotiations over Karabakh resolution will decrease a little, and perhaps, the leading function will for some time be taken over by the EU or, for example, France. On the other hand, no breakthrough in the negotiations is currently possible regardless of who the initiator of the negotiations is and who facilitates the process. Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan is currently ready to compromise, and any success in this issue can be achieved only on the basis of profound compromises by both parties. Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan is ready to compromise, and this means that the negotiations are doomed. The main principles of Russia’s policy, at least with regard to Armenia and Azerbaijan, are not changing.

Anna Bartkulashvili, freelance journalist (Azerbaijan)

–Both Turkey and Iran would like to participate in the negotiation process over the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. What do you think the role of either would be? Thanks.

-I will skip Turkey and I will focus on Iran. Personally I do not see how Iran, in its current position of a rogue country, can play an active role in the resolution of the Karabakh issue. In the current conditions the West and the USA will not allow this. If we are to imagine that Iran’s role will increase in this issue, it will immediately bring about a sharp counteraction by Washington and European capitals. Both Baku and Yerevan and even Moscow will be simply obliged to take this into consideration…

Artak Barseghyan, Public Radio of Armenia-www.armradio.am (Armenia)

1. What are the prospects of the rapprochement of Russia and Turkey?

–The Russian and Turkish relations are currently at a high level. Along with this, in the deep sense Moscow and Ankara still remain competitors and if at this point some interests of our countries do coincide, we cannot expect that this will happen all the time and in relation to all issues. We already diverge on a number of issues, such as Karabakh or energy policy. If people in Armenia are afraid that something similar to what was there between Russia and Turkey in the 1920s may happen again, this, I should say, is impossible.

2. What influence will a probable war waged by the USA against Iran have on the region?

–Huge, simply immense. I think that this question is not completely studied, but some thoughts are emerging. In particular, the editor-in-chief of the journal called Russia in Global Politics Fyodor Lukyanov spoke about the consequences several times. Let us imagine what will happen if the USA achieve as much control over Iran as they did over Iraq. Then they will be in control of the last “free” segment of the Armenian border and, they will theoretically be able to augment the pressure on Armenia. What will happen then? Then the weight of the American version of Karabakh resolution will increase very significantly, and the established balance will be ruined. The Americanization of Armenia (which is already quite significant) will increase, and Armenia will drift more towards Washington. I can foresee that in its own turn, in order to preserve its influence in the region, Russia will need to come closer to Azerbaijan. It is difficult to forecast the configuration of the region in this case, but the fact that it will seriously change, is certain and it is not yet clear whether this change will be positive for the countries in the region.

Anna Bartkulashvili, freelance journalist (Azerbaijan)

–What will determine the agenda for Russia in South Caucasus next year?

–Elections in Russia and the continuation of preparations for the Olympiad, Karabakh, NABUCCO, the continuation of the scandals in Abkhazia, the attempts to maintain good relations simultaneously with Armenia and Azerbaijan and the degree to which political course of Georgia proves anti-Russian.  In relation to Georgia, I should also mention the situation with WTO, in any case the embargo will be lifted, it is already and practically lifted at least with regard to wines and mineral water; this process will only intensify.

Armen Minasyan, panorama.am (Armenia)

–Please explain your position with regard to the issue of the repetition of the “Arab syndrome” in the countries in South Caucasus, in particular, in Georgia and Azerbaijan?

–I have to ask you to excuse me, but I do not have enough time to answer this question.